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BEING SECURE IN ONE'S PERSON:




On May 20, 1992, a federal grand jury indicted judge David Lanier
of, among other things, depriving a woman of a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest without due process; the implicated liberty inter-
est was the right to be free from sexual assault.' The indictment alleged
that Lanier, who at the time was the sole Chancery and Juvenile Court
judge for two rural counties in western Tennessee, sexually assaulted
several women in his judicial chambers. 2 The allegations against Judge
Lanier ran the gamut from unwanted grabbing and groping to forcing
a woman, over whose child custody hearing he was to preside, to have
oral sex with him in his chambers while he was wearing his judicial
robes.3 In the absence of state prosecution (Judge Lanier came from
a politically prominent family and his brother was the local prosecu-
tor), the federal government prosecuted judge Lanier under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 ("section 242"), which criminalizes the willful "deprivation of any
rights . . . protected by the Constitution" committed by any person
under "color of state law." 4 The ensuing litigation has raised a number
of issues, including whether a constitutional right to bodily integrity
exists to the extent that citizens are constitutionally protected from
state-occasioned sexual assault.5
I See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1380 (1996) (en
bane), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
2 See id.
3 See id. at 645-50.
4 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994); see United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) [Lanier Ill, rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997). Section 242 states in relevant
part:
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully
subjects any inhabitant in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws
of the United States ... [and if] such acts include ... aggravated sexual abuse, or
an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be lined
under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be
sentenced to death.
18 U.S.C. § 242.
5 See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 645 (6th Cir. 1994), rev d, 73 F.3d 1380 (1996) (en
bane), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct, 1219, 1224 (1997).
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PROLOGUE
Determining if sexual assault by a sitting judge violates a constitu-
tionally protected right involves a number of distinct inquiries. 6 This
Note focuses solely on whether the right to bodily integrity is encom-
passed by the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
and, in turn, whether the right to bodily integrity incorporates the
right to be free from sexual assault.? Part I of this Note examines the
history of substantive due process in the context of the right to bodily
integrity. 6 Part II examines the Lanier case, including the recent United
States Supreme Court decision delineating the correct standard for
determining if conduct falls within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 242.'
Part III reviews how the Supreme Court and various appeals courts
have recognized the right to bodily integrity.th Part IV addresses
whether sexual abuse violates a recognized right of bodily integrity and
concludes that it does."
I. BACKGROUND
This Part is broken into three subsections. Subsection A discusses
18 U.S.C. § 242 and how this statute has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court.' 2 Subsection B discusses past Supreme Court decisions
with respect to whether or not bodily integrity is a recognized consti-
tutional right.' 3
 Subsection C discusses past circuit court decisions and
the existence of a constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity
and, more specifically, the right to be free from sexual abuse."
A. 18 U.S.C. § 242
Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 242 in 1874. 15 The language of
section 242 was part of an attempt by Congress to merge and thereby
6
 For example, one issue is whether fundamental unenumerated rights are entitled to con-
stitutional protection under the rubric of substantive due process and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The validity of substantive due process, however, is beyond the scope of this Note. This
Note assumes it to he valid within the context of past. Supreme Court precedent. Likewise, this
Note will not address the issue of what constitutes an act "under color of law."
7 See infra Parts 1, 11, III and IV.
" See infra notes 12-151 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 152-278 and accompanying text.
la See infra notes 279-306 and accompanying text.
II See infra notes 307-28 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 36-116 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 117-51 and accompanying text.
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994); United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1384 (6th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) [Lanier 14, reed and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
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codify sections of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, the 1870 Civil Rights Act
and the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act—statutes that punished corruption and
distortion of lawful state processes by state officials.' 6 Section 242, as
codified in 1874, criminalized the deprivation of any rights protected
by the Constitution by any person under color of law." In 1909, Con-
gress amended the statute to add the requirement of willfulness.'" In
1988, Congress amended section 242 by including an additional pen-
alty provision for bodily injury.' 9 Congress again amended the statute
in 1994 to include the death penalty and other enhanced penalty
provisions, including penalties for sexual abuse and attempted sexual
abuse."
In 1945, in Screws v. United States, the United States Supreme
Court held in a plurality decision that section 242 was not unconstitu-
tionally vague. 21 In Screws, the defendants—the sheriff of Baker County,
Georgia along with two other policemen—made a late night arrest of
Robert Hall." After arresting Hall, a young black man, and driving him
to the courthouse, the defendants severely beat the handcuffed Hall
for fifteen to thirty minutes." The defendants then dragged Hall feet
first through the courthouse and threw him into a jail ce11. 24 Hall died
shortly thereafter. 25 The federal government charged the defendants
with depriving Hall of his constitutionally protected rights in violation
of section 242. 20 The defendants argued that, although they may have
violated state law, they did not violate any of Hall's constitutionally
protected rights. 27 In addition, they challenged the constitutionality of
section 242 itself, arguing that the statute lacked the basic specificity
necessary for criminal statutes to give notice to potential violators."
Although it acknowledged the danger that a vague criminal statute
poses, the Court emphasized that the word "willful" in a criminal
See 18 U.S.C. § 242; 17 Stat. 13 (1871); 16 Stat.. 144 (1870); 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Larder II,
73 F.3d at 1384-86.
17 18 U.S.C. § 242; we Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1384 & ILL
18 18 U.S.C. § 242; see Larder II, 73 F.3d at 1384 n.l.
19 18 U.S.C. § 242; see Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1384 n.1.
20 See 18	 § 242; Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1384 11.1.
21 325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945).
22 Id. at 92.
23 See id. at 92-93.
21 See id. at 93.
25 See id.
26 See. Screws, 325 U.S. at 93. In Screws, the defendants were convicted under § 20 of the
Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 52, which has since been codified as 18 U.S.C. § 242. Id.; see United
States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane) [Lanier III, revel and remanded, 117
S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
27 See Screws, 325 U.S. at 94 n. I.
25 See id. at 96.
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statute denotes an act done intentionally and with a malign purpose. 29
The Court reasoned that the specific intent required by the statute is
the intent to deprive a person of a right that has been "made specific
either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United
States or by decisions interpreting them." 3" The Court further reasoned
that this definition of rights "made specific" provides adequate notice
to potential violators that they are criminally liable under section 242. 3 '
In Screws, the Court concluded that the defendants—by taking the law
into their own hands and acting as prosecutor, judge and jury—de-
prived Hall of his constitutionally protected right to a trial in a court
of law, subjecting him instead to a "trial by ordeal." 32 The Court rea-
soned that the concept of a jury trial is basic to the concept of due
process." The Court further reasoned that the fact that the defendants
were not thinking in constitutional terms was not material; as long as
their aim was to deprive a citizen of a constitutionally protected right
rather than to enforce local law, then they did so in reckless disre-
gard of constitutional prohibitions or guarantees. 34
 Thus, the Supreme
Court held that the requirement of specific intent to deprive a person
of a federal right saves section 242 from being unconstitutionally
vague."
B. Bodily Integrity and United States Supreme Court Precedent
In 1952, in Rochin v. California, the United States Supreme Court
held that pumping the stomach of a suspect against his will violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." In Rochin,
the police, acting on a tip, conducted a drug raid on a private resi-
dence. 37
 Before the police could confiscate two unidentified capsules
on a night stand in the defendant's room, however, the defendant
swallowed the capsules." The police then took the defendant to a
hospital and ordered a doctor to force an emetic solution through a
tube into the defendant's stomach to induce vomiting." The police
29 Id. at 96-97, 101.
" Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
31 Id.




58 342 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1952).
37 Id. at 166.
"See id.
" See id.
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found two morphine capsules in the vomit." The two capsules were
the primary evidence against the defendant at trial.'" On the strength
of this evidence, the defendant was convicted. 42
 On appeal, the Cali-
fornia District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction." The Califor-
nia Supreme Court denied the defendant's petition for a hearing
without opinion.'"
Having exhausted his appeals in state court, the defendant ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court." The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and reversed." The Court reasoned
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a con-
stitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which
are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."' The Court also drew an analogy between
obtaining evidence by pumping an unwilling suspect's stomach and
coercing a confession." The Court reasoned that it would be incon-
gruous to hold that "in order to convict a man the police cannot
extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his
stomach."4J The Court further recognized that the forcible extraction
of evidence from a person's stomach is so offensive to human dignity
that it "shocks the conscience."5° In so doing, the Court implicitly
reasoned that the brutality of the force exercised by the State in
obtaining the evidence offended the Due Process Clause.'" Thus, the
Supreme Court held that forcibly extracting evidence from a suspect's
stomach violates the constitutional guarantee of respect for personal
immunities protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 52
In 1977, in Ingraham v. Wright, the United States Supreme Court
held that individuals have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
l" See id.
41 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
42 See id.
45 See id.
44 See id. at 167.
45 See id. at 168.
46 Ruchin, 342 U.S. at 174.
47 Id, at 168-69 (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934)).
48 Id. at 172-73. The Court noted that not only are coerced confessions unreliable but, more
importantly, they offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. Id. at 173.
49 1d. at 173.
Id. at 172, 174.
51 See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173-74.
52 1d. at 168-69.
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in being free from bodily restraint and punishment." In Ingraham, two
pupils from a Dade County, Florida junior high school filed a class ac-
tion suit in district court for damages as well as injunctive and decla-
ratory relief, alleging that the school subjected students to disciplinary
corporal punishment in violation of their constitutional rights." Cor-
poral punishment in Dade County consisted of paddling recalcitrant
students on the buttocks with a flat wooden paddle as a means of
maintaining discipline in the classroom." The district court granted a
motion for a directed verdict in favor of the school district, concluding
that the punishment authorized and practiced in the county school
did not violate any constitutional right." A panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, concluding that the punishment
was so severe and oppressive that it violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments and that the procedures outlined in the statute author-
izing the use of corporal punishment failed to satisfy the requirements
of the Due Process Clause. 57 Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
bane, rejected these conclusions and affirmed the judgment of the
district court."
In affirming the en bane court of appeals judgment, the Supreme
Court reasoned that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment did not apply outside of the criminal process
con text.'9
 Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that corporal punish-
ment did implicate a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 61) Spe-
cifically, the Court reasoned that the right to be free from unjustified
58 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977).
5 ' 1 Id. at 653-54.
See id. at 655. Normal punishment was limited to one to five blows with the paddle. See id.
Ely statute, teachers were required to consult with the principal prior to paddling students. See
id. Nonetheless, teachers would often paddle students on their own authority without first
consulting the principal. See id.
•" See id. at 654, 658.
57 See id. at 658. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion slates in relevant part:
All persons horn or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof', are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
58 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 658.
5" M. at 668-439.
(4) Id. at 672.
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intrusions on personal security by the state is a historically protected
right."' In addition, the Court recognized that this historic liberty
interest encompasses freedom from bodily restraint and punishment." 2
Thus, the Court concluded that corporal punishment implicated a
constitutionally protected right to be free from bodily restraint and
punishment.°
The Court recognized, however, the historical and widely accepted
notion that reasonable corporal punishment in school is justified."
Consequently, the Court balanced the child's liberty interest in avoid-
ing corporal punishment while in the care of public school authorities
against the school's interest in preserving a traditional and widely
accepted means of discipline."5
 The Supreme Court concluded that
Florida's preservation of common-law constraints and remedies on the
use of corporal punishment satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process requirement'" Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Four-
teenth Amendment protects a liberty interest that encompasses the
right to be free from bodily restraint and punishment but that a
long-standing accommodation of interests precluded a substantive due
process violation, provided that the disciplinary corporal punishment
is within the limits of the common-law privilege.'''
In 1982, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to personal security and the right to be free from
bodily restraint are constitutionally protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 68 In Youngberg, the mother of a
severely retarded man sued the state facility where her son was com-
mitted, alleging that the facility failed to institute adequate preventa-
tive procedures to protect her son from injury." 9
 After the trial judge
instructed the jury on the proper standard for liability under the
Eighth Amendment, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defen-
dants.'" The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en Banc,
reversed and remanded for a new trial, reasoning that the involuntar-
lit Id.
"2 Id. at 673-74.
63 inArrahanr, 430 U.S. at 674.
64 14, at 675-76.
14.
"14. at 675-76, 683.
1 i7 14. at 672.
68 457 U.S. 307, 317-21, 325 (1982).
69 14. at 309-10. The mother became concerned with the number and severity or the injuries
befalling her son, alleging that her son suffered injury on 63 occasions from July 1974 to
November 1976. See id at 310.
70 See id. at 312.
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ily-committed retain liberty interests in freedom of movement and
in personal security which are properly protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the
Third Circuit and further held that involuntary commitment did not
extinguish the right to personal security or the right to freedom from
bodily restraint as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 The
Court reasoned that confinement, even in a criminal context, did not
extinguish these rights, and, therefore, they must necessarily survive
involuntary confinement." The Court then stated that a determination
of whether an individual's rights had been violated required balancing
the "liberty of the individual" against the "demands of an organized
society" by weighing the individual's interest in liberty against the
State's asserted reason for restraining the individual'" In balancing the
competing interests of the State and the individual, the Court reasoned
that the Constitution only requires that courts "make certain that
professional judgment was in fact exercised."" Consequently, the Court
vacated the appeals court decision and remanded for a new trial
consistent with the Court's decision. 76 Thus, the Supreme Court held
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberty interests in personal
security and the freedom from bodily restraint."
In 1989, in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Service, the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose an affirmative
duty on the state to prevent an individual from being deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process by means other than state
action." In DeShaney, the mother of a child who suffered permanent
brain damage after being severely beaten by his father filed an action
on behalf of her son pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"). 79
71 See id. The en bane court did not, however, agree on a standard for determining if the
plaintiff's rights had been violated. See id. at 313.
72 Id. at 315-16. The Court also determined that the plaintiff was entitled to minimally
adequate training to help him keep from hurting himself and thereby prevent an unconstitutional
infringement of his protected rights to personal security and freedom from bodily restraint. Id.
at 322-23.
73
 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
74 Id. at 320.
75 1d. at 321-22. The Court added that the professional judgment standard is lower than the
"compelling" or "substantial" state interest standard that a state would have to meet in order to
justify, use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. Id. at 322.
" Id. at 325.
" Id. at 317-21.
78 489 U.S. 189,195 (1989).
79 Id. at 193. Section 1983 states in relevant part:
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The complaint alleged that the Winnebago County Department of
Social Services ("DSS") failed to intervene and protect the boy from
his father, thereby depriving the boy of his liberty interest in bodily
integrity in violation of his substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 8° The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants."' On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that petitioners had failed to state a claim because the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require state or local governments to
protect citizens from "private violence.""
In affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court determined
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment functions
as a limit on state action and does not provide a general guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security." The Court reasoned that
the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to protect the people from the state, not to ensure that the state
protected people from one another." The Court further reasoned that
only an affirmative exercise of state power to limit an individual's
liberty can trigger a corresponding affirmative duty to provide for that
individual's basic needs." Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
Due Process Clause does not confer an entitlement to government aid,
even if such aid is necessary to protect life, liberty or property interests
of which the government may not deprive the individual. 88
 Thus, the
Supreme Court held that a state's failure to protect an individual from
violence perpetrated by private parties does not constitute a violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process. 87
In 1990, in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring clear
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
80 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 193-94. The court also held, in the alternative, that. the causal connection between
the conduct of the DSS and the boy's injuries was too attenuated to establish a deprivation of
constitutional rights. See id.
83 Id. at 195.
84 Id. at 196.
85 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200.
86 1d. at 196.
87 Id. at 197.
1020	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 38:1011
and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's wishes to have
life-sustaining treatment withdrawn."" In so doing, however, the Court
recognized that a competent person has a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in determining what shall be done with his or her own
body.'" In Cruzan, Nancy Beth Cruzan suffered severe cerebral injuries
in an automobile accident that left her in a persistent vegetative state. 9°
Cruzan's parents sought a court order to remove her from artificial
feeding and hydration once it became apparent that she had little or
no chance of recovery. 9' The trial court granted the request finding
that she had a fundamental right to refuse treatment and that prior to
her accident, she had expressed a desire, if sick or injured, not to
continue her life unless she could live "at least halfway normally."92 The
Supreme Court of Missouri reversed."
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Missouri Supreme Court." The Court recognized that
"[r]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person . . ."95 The Court reasoned that the requirement of informed
consent is derivative of this notion of bodily integrity.` "' The Court
further reasoned that the logical corollary to the informed consent
doctrine is the right to refuse treatment." 7 Thus, the Court concluded
that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est in refusing medical treatment."
The Court further reasoned, however, that the liberty interest in
refusing medical interest must be balanced against relevant state inter-
""497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990).
"9 M. at 269, 278.
"Id. at 266. A persistent vegetative state is generally characterized as "a condition in which
a person exhibits motor reflexes but evinces no indications of significant cognitive function." Id.
91 See id. at 267.
92 See id. The trial court based its finding on a serious discussion Nancy Cruzan had at age
25 with a housemate in which she expressed that if injured or sick, she would not want to continue
her life unless she could live a halfway normal life. See id. at 268.
" Cruzan by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988). The problem for the
parents was that they did not have "clear and convincing" evidence that their daughter would
have wanted them to discontinue life support. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 268. The Supreme Court
of Missouri found Nancy's statements to her housemate regarding her desire to live or die under
certain conditions to be "unreliable for the purpose of determining her intent." Cruzan by
Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
9-1 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287.
95 Id. at 269 (quoting Union Pacific Ky. Co. v. BotslOrd, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
96 Id.
97 1d. at 270.
98 Id. at 278.
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ests.'9 The Court reasoned that establishing a procedural safeguard—
requiring clear and convincing evidence—to assure that a decision on
behalf of an incompetent patient conforms with the express wishes of
the patient while competent does not contravene the Constitution.'"°
Thus, although the Court determined that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing treatment, the
Court held that a state may apply a clear and convincing evidence
standard in situations where a guardian seeks to discontinue life sup-
port for a person in a persistent vegetative state.'°'
In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, the United States Supreme Court held that the liberty interest
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment encom-
passed a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.'° 2
 In so doing,
the Court held that a state may not prohibit a woman from making the
ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability."' In
Casey, abortion clinics and physicians challenged the constitutionality
of several provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act ("Abor-
tion Act"). 104 Implicit in the challenge to the law was an assertion that
the law infringed upon a woman's right, guaranteed in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to terminate her pregnancy as
was held in the seminal abortion case Roe v. Wade. 1 "5
In analyzing the claim, the Court revisited its previous holding in
Roe and reaffirmed the "essential" holding of Roe. 106 The Court reiter-
ri
	 497 U.S. at 279.
tht Id. at 282.
101 Id. at 284.
"505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). 'Ile Court also held, however, that states are permitted to
regulate abortion provided the regulations do not place an undue burden on a woman's right
to choose. Id. at 878-79.
" Id. at 879.
" Id. at 844. The challenged provisions included an informed consent requirement that a
woman seeking an abortion be provided certain inkirmation at least twenty-four hours before
the abortion is to be performed; an informed consent requirement that minors seeking an
abortion obtain the informed consent of a parent or avail themselves of a judicial bypass option
if they could not obtain a parent's consent; a spousal consent requirement; and, a reporting
requirement on facilities performing abortions. See id.
1 °5 See id. at 845; Roe v. Wade, 411) U.S. 113, 153 (1972). In 1972, in Roe it Wade, the United
States Supreme Court held that a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy was
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 410 U.S. at 153. In Roe, the plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of a Texas statute prohibiting abortions with a few narrow exceptions. Id. at.
117-22, The Court reasoned that the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy fell within
the tunbit. of a right to privacy protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 153. Thus, the
Supreme Court held that a woman's right to choose to terminate her pregnancy was protected
by the Constitution. Id.
1 °° Casey,.505 U.S. at 846; see Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. The Court reaffirmed that: I) a woman
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ated that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy derives its
constitutional protection from the liberty guarantee in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1 °7
 The Court plainly rejected
the interpretation that liberty, as protected by the Constitution, encom-
passes only those rights already guaranteed to citizens against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments
to the Constitution."' Similarly, the Court rejected an interpretation
of substantive due process that protects only those practices that were
specifically defined and protected from government interference when
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.'" Instead, the Court recog-
nized that the definition of liberty lies on a rational continuum; its
boundaries are not susceptible to expression in a simple rule but rather
rely upon reasoned judicial judgment and restraint."°
The Court continued by noting that substantive due process af-
fords constitutional protection to personal decisions related to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing
and education."' The Court reasoned that not only do these matters
involve the most intimate and personal choices a person can make, but
such choices are central to personal dignity and autonomy, which, in
turn, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 12
 In particular, the Court reasoned that a state could not insist
that a woman undergo the unique pain, physical constraints and anxi-
eties that are implicit in carrying a child to term." 3 The Court also
drew an analogy between the decision to terminate a pregnancy and
the decision to use contraception, which has been granted constitu-
tional protection." 4
 Finally, the Court paid great deference to the rule
of stare decisis, recognizing that for two decades of economic and social
development, people have organized intimate relationships and deci-
sions in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that con-
has the right to choose to have an abortion before viability and obtain it without undue interfer-
ence from the state; 2) a state may restrict abortions after fetal viability, provided the law makes
exceptions for the health of the mother; and 3) a state has a legitimate interest from the outset
of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus. Casey, 505 U.S.
al 846.
1117 ird.
1 °8 Id. at 847.
1 °9 Id.
"° Id. at 847-48.
"'Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
112 1d. at 851.
113 Id. at 852.
''4 Id.; see, e.g. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (protecting right of unmarried couples
to use contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting right of married
couples to
 use contraception).
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traception should fail."' The Court ultimately held, however, that all
of the contested provisions of the Abortion Act, with the exception of
the provision requiring spousal approval, did not unreasonably in-
fringe upon a woman's right to choose, and, therefore, were not un-
constitutional.""
C. Circuit Court Precedent
In 1980, in Hall v. 'limn6y, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit held that the infliction of corporal punishment
implicated a constitutionally protected right to be free from state-oc-
casioned invasions of personal privacy and bodily integrity.'''' In Hall,
Naomi Hall, through her parents, appealed the dismissal of their suit
against school officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their
constitutional rights when Naomi was paddled by her schoolteacher." 8
The court first determined that Hall's substantive due process claim
was distinct from any rights she may have under the State's assault and
battery law." 9 The court concluded that Hall's claim was appropriately
grounded in a constitutional right protected by the substantive due
process component of the Due Process Clause; namely the right to be
free from state-occasioned invasions of personal security and bodily
integrity. 12° The court reasoned that the right to bodily security is the
most fundamental element of personal privacy.' 21 The court further
reasoned that if criminal suspects in the custody of the police are
protected from invasions of their personal security, then public school
students, under the disciplinary control of school officials, have the
same right. 122 The court concluded that the complaint alleged facts
sufficient to state a claim against the participants in the paddling
incident but not against their supervisors.' 23 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
held that the disciplinary paddling of a student could violate the
115 Casey, 505 U.S. at 859, 856.
119 Id. as 900.
117 621 F.2d (107, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
119 1d. at 609. In addition, Hall alleged that her right to procedural due process, freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment. and equal protection of the laws, as well as her parents'
rights to substantive due process, were violated. See id. at 609-10.
119 /d. at 613. The court recognized that relief under 92 U.S.C. § 1983 is not dependent upon
the unavailability of state remedies. Id. at 612. The court noted, however, that not every violation
of state tort or criminal assault laws becomes a federal tort, violative of the constitution, simply
because it is committed by a state employee. Id. at 613.
120 Id. at 611, 613.
121 Id, at 613,
122 Hall, 621 F.2d at 6 13 .
hi. at 614-15.
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student's substantive due process right to be free from state-occasioned
invasions of his or her bodily integrity. 124
In 1983, in United States v. Davila, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that two border patrol officers were
properly convicted under section 242 for depriving two women of their
liberty by coercing sexual favors from them. 125
 In Davila, the defen-
dants stopped an automobile containing two United States Army pri-
vates accompanied by two women who had entered the country ille-
gally.''' The border patrol officers kept the two women in their custody
and took them to an apartment owned by one of the officersin There,
the officers coerced the women into having sexual intercourse with
them in exchange for their freedom.' 28
 The court reasoned that the
evidence produced at trial was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to
find the officers guilty of coercing sexual favors from their victims and,
thereby, depriving the women of their liberty as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 29
 Thus, the Fifth Circuit upheld convictions
under section 242 resulting from the deprivation of the constitutionally
protected liberty interest in being free from sexual coercion.'"
In 1989, in Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that sexual assault
violates a liberty interest—which is protected by the substantive due
process component of the Fourteenth Amendment—to be free from
state-occasioned invasion of a person's bodily integrity."' In Stoneking,
Kathleen Stoneking filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prin-
cipal and assistant principal of the Bradford Area High School as well
as the superintendent of the Bradford Area School District for main-
taining a policy of reckless indifference to known or suspected sexual
abuse and, thereby, creating a climate that condoned the sexual abuse
of students by teachers.'" Stoneking alleged that school officials were
aware that Edward Wright, the Bradford High Band Director, sexually
abused Stoneking and forced her to engage in various sexual acts
beginning in 1980, when Stoneking was a sophomore in high school,
and continuing through 1985.'" The defendants, however, maintained
121 Id. at 614.
125 704 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Ur. 1983).




129 Id. at 750, 752.
111' 1 Daiii/a, 704 F.2d at 750.
151 882 F.2d 720, 726-27 (3d Cir. 1959).
132
 Id. at 724-25.
1)3
	 id. at 722. Wright ultimately pled guilty to various sex-related crimes and school officials
conceded that some or the acts occurred in the band room at the high school and on school
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that they were entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct
did "not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."" 4 The court's inquiry
focused first on whether an existing right had been violated, and,
second, whether reasonable school officials should have known, in
light of clearly established law, that they could be held liable for
maintaining a custom, practice or usage that communicated condona-
tion of assaultive behavior.'"
In the first instance, the court concluded that it was not only
impermissible for school teachers to sexually molest students, but also
that sexual assault violated the constitutionally protected right to be
free from unjustified intrusions on personal security. 15" The court rea-
soned that sexual molestation of a student is not substantively different,
for constitutional purposes, from corporal punishment and that rea-
sonable officials would have understood that the "contours" of a stu-
dent's right to bodily integrity under the Due Process Clause included
the right to be free from sexual assault." 7 The court further reasoned
that by 1981 it was clearly established that maintaining a custom,
practice or usage that communicated tolerance of assaultive behavior
violated the law.'si1 After examining the information possessed by the
defendants and the actions taken in response to what they knew, the
court concluded that the principal and assistant principal were not
entitled to qualified immunity but that the superintendent was entitled
to qualified immunity.'• Thus, the Third Circuit held that sexual as-
sault violated a constitutionally protected right to be free from inva-
sions of a person's bodily in tegrity. t 4°
In 1991, in United States v. Contreras, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a police officer was properly
convicted under section 242 for willfully depriving a woman of her
trips, as well as in his own homc and car after Stoneking baby-sat for him or after he gave her a
music lesson. See id.
154 1d. at 726 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1992)).
155 /d. at 726.
"6 Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726-27 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 & n.41 (1977)).
In light of DeShaney, the court did not rest its analysis on an affirmative duty by school officials
to protect students from harm. Id. at 723-24; see Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept of Soc.
Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). The court nevertheless distinguished DeShaney on the grounds that
a private citizen inflicted DeShaney's injuries, whereas Stoneking was assaulted by a state ens-
ployee. Staneking, 882 F.2d at 724; Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 189.
137 StOneking, 882 F.2d at 727.
158 /d. at 727, 730.
1 " Id. at 731. The court reasoned that the superintendent was entitled to qualified in»ntinity
because there was no evidence that the superintendent took any affirmative action to indicate
tolerance, condonation or encouragement of assaultive behavior. Id,
14') Id. at 726.
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constitutional rights by sexually assaulting her."' In Contreras, an on-
duty police officer forced a woman to have sex with him in the back
of his patrol car. 142
 The court reasoned that there was sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty of depriving
his victim of her constitutional rights by sexually assaulting her." 3 Thus,
the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant was properly convicted under
section 242 for depriving a woman of her constitutionally protected
right to be free from sexual abuse.'"
In 1994, in Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that sexual abuse
violates the right to bodily integrity protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."" In Taylor, Jane Doe, a high
school student, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against her biol-
ogy teacher—Jessie Stroud, the principal of Taylor High and the su-
perintendent of the Taylor Independent School District as a result of
being sexually molested by Stroud."' The principal and superinten-
dent appealed the denial of their motions for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds arguing, among other things, that Jane
Doe was not deprived of any constitutional right and that even if she
was deprived of a constitutional right, that the issues of law with respect
to her constitutional right were not "clearly established" in 1987 when
the violations took place. 17
 The court concluded that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to be free
from state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity and that
bodily integrity is "necessarily violated" when a state actor sexually
141 950 F.2d 232, 236, 244 (5th Cir. 1991).
142
 Id. at 235. The officer stopped the woman for questioning. See id. When she could not
produce identification, he told her to get into his cruiser for the purpose of transporting her to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). See id. Instead of taking her to the INS, the
officer took her to an isolated area and sexually assaulted her in the back of the police cruiser.
See id. In addition, because he kept his gun within reach at all times—taking off his holster to
keep it near him while he sexually assaulted his victim—he was charged with using and carrying
a weapon in relation to a crime of violence. See id. at 235-36. The officer testified, however, that
the woman offered to have sex with him, willingly removed her clothes and participated in
consensual intercourse. See id. at 235. Finally, the officer was also convicted of conspiring to kill
the woman to prevent her from testifying at trial. See id. at 236, 244.
145 1d. at 244.
144 Id. at 236, 244.
145
 15 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1994).
146,
	 at 449-50.
147 See id. at 450. In addition, the principal and the superintendent argued that even if Doe
had been deprived of a constitutional right, they owed her no duty with respect to the violation
of this right and even if they did, their response to the situation satisfied any obligation they owed
Doe. See id.
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abuses a schoolchild. 148 The court drew an analogy to corporal punish-
ment, but reasoned that unlike corporal punishment, there can never
be any justification for sexually molesting a schoolchild.'" In addition,
the court concluded that the "contours" of Doe's substantive due
process right to be free from sexual abuse were clearly established in
1987.'" Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that sexual abuse violates the right
to be free from state-occasioned invasions of a person's bodily integrity
as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 15 '
H. DEFINING A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT WITHIN THE SCOPE AND
MEANING OF 18 U.S.C. § 242: THE CASE OF JUDGE DAVIT] LANIER
In December of 1992, a jury found Judge David Lanier guilty of
sexual assault and convicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for violating
his victims' constitutionally protected rights.' 52 judge Lanier appealed
his conviction to the United State Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, arguing, among other things, that sexual assault does not
violate a constitutionally protected right.'" A panel of the Sixth Circuit
upheld Judge Lanier's conviction." On rehearing en bane, however,
the Sixth Circuit reversed the panel decision and dismissed the indict-
ment against judge Lanier.' 55 Subsequently, the United States Supreme
148 1d. at 451-52.
1111 Id. The court acknowledged that there has not been a similar case directly on point. Id.
at 455. Nevertheless, as with the hypothetical case of welfare officials selling foster children into
slavery, it does not follow that in such a case officials would he immune from liability. See id. Given
the similarly egregious conduct involved in this case, the court reasoned that any reasonable
public school official would have known that sexually assaulting a schoolchild violated the
constitutional protected right to be free from invasions of bodily integrity. Id.
15° nylon 15 E3d at 451, 455 (relying primarily on Jefferson v. Ysleta hulep. Sch. Dist., 817
E2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that schoolchild's substantive due process right was violated
when teacher lashed schoolchild to chair for two days) and Shil]ingford v. Hohnes, 634 E2d 263,
265 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that police officer violated tourist's right to be free from state-occa-
sioned damage to bodily integrity by striking tourist, who was taking picture of arrest, with
nightstick)). The court also concluded that the principal and superintendent's duty with respect
to the violation of Doe's constitutional rights was clearly established by 1987. 14. The court
similarly determined that. Doe stated facts sufficient to withstand a motimi Mr summary judgment
that the principal did not fulfill the duty owed to her. Id, at 457. The court, however, concluded
that Doe did not sufficiently state facts sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment
against the superintendent with respect to the duty owed to her. Id. at 458.
151
 Id. ai 451-52.
1 •52 See United States v. Lanier, 33 F.3d 639, 650 (6th Cir. 1994) [Lanier], revil, 73 F.3d 1380
(1990) (en bane), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
153 See id. at 650-51.
154 See id. at 666.
155 United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) [Lanier II], rev'd
and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
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Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, remanding the case for further con-
sideration under the proper standard for determining whether a gen-
erally phrased constitutional right has been made specific for purposes
of section 242. 156
This Part is broken into three subsections. Subsection A discusses
the Sixth Circuit panel decision. 157
 Subsection B discusses the en banc
decision of the Sixth Circuit. 158 Subsection C discusses the Supreme
Court decision.'"
A. Take One: The Conviction Is Upheld
In 1994, in United States v. Lanier, a three-member panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the right
to be free from state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity
included the right to be free from sexual assault." In Lanier, a Ten-
nessee Chancery Court judge appealed his conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 for willfully depriving several women of their constitutional
rights under color of law.' 61 Judge Lanier's appeal was, among other
things, based upon evidentiary and procedural issues as well as an
assertion that his conduct did not violate the Constitution.' 62
The jury found Judge Lanier guilty on seven of eleven counts of
sexual assault in violation of section 242.' 63 The jury convicted Judge
Lanier of sexually assaulting Patty Mahoney, an employee of the Chan-
cery Court of Dyer County In the fall of 1990, Judge Lanier hired
Mahoney to be his secretary.' 65 By the second day of the job Judge
Lanier was hugging her, touching her buttocks and touching her
breasts."'6
 Judge Lanier soon became even more aggressive, grabbing
and squeezing her breasts rather than just placing his hands on
them.' 67
 Mahoney confronted Judge Lanier only to be told that if she
reported his behavior "it would hurt her more than it would hurt
156 United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Gt. 1219, 1228 (1997) [Lanier III].
157 See infra notes 160-213 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 214-55 and accompanying text.
159 See infra notes 256-78 and accompanying text.
"33 F.3d at 651 (citing Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205, 1210 (5th Cir, 1985)).
161 See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 645.
"See id.
' 6:i See id. at 645, 650. At the close of the trial, the court granted judge Lanier's motion for
a judgment of acquittal on one count of sexual assault and the jury found him not guilty on three
other counts. See id.
164 See id. at 646.
165 See id. at 647.
"See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 647.
167 See id.
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him."" The touching and grabbing continued on a daily basis until
Mahoney could no longer tolerate it."'`' She begged Judge Lanier to
stop because she needed the job to support her two children and told
Judge Lanier that if he did not stop, she would be forced to quit."° At
that point, Judge Lanier put his arms around her, aggressively hugging
her and pressing his pelvis against her." After two weeks on the job,
Mahoney quit. 172
The jury also convicted Judge Lanier of sexually assaulting Vivian
Archie, over whose divorce he presided.'" Subsequent to her divorce,
Archie interviewed with Judge Lanier for a secretarial job. 174 During
the interview, Judge Lanier told Archie that her ex-husband had been
to see him about gaining custody of her child but that he could not
talk about the case because he would preside over the matter."' There-
after, Judge Lanier grabbed Archie and held her down in a chair while
trying to kiss and fondle her. 176 Finally, Judge Lanier stood over Archie,
exposed himself and pulled her head clown and her jaws open, forcing
her to perform oral sex on him.'" Fearful of losing custody of her
child, Archie did not scream or report him.' 78 Soon after this incident,
Judge Lanier inveigled Archie, with information of another job pros-
pect, to return to his chambers."" When Archie arrived at Judge
Lanier's chambers, he told her about a secretarial position available in
a doctor's office.m Before she could leave, however, Judge Lanier again
sexually assaulted Archie, once more orally raping hen's'
In addition, the jury convicted Judge Lanier of sexually assaulting
Fonda Bandy. 182 Bandy worked for a federal program, Drug Free Hous-









176 See Lanier, 33 F.5(1 at 648.
177 See id.
178 See id.
17`0 id. Judge Lanier hu ed Archie back to his chambers by leaving a message with Archie's
number for Archie about it,job interview but said that Archie had to come to his chambers to gel
the information. See id. Archie's mother insisted that Archie go to see Judge Lauder to obtain the
information. See id.
1141' See id.
181 See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 648.
182 See id. at 646.
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who lived in public housing and who had children in juvenile court
before Judge Lanier.'" After presenting her project to Judge Lanier in
chambers, Judge Lanier put his arms around her and began kissing
her and fondling her breasts.'" Bandy freed herself and went into the
bathroom before leaving his chambers.' 85
 To exit the chambers, how-
ever, Bandy had to pass Judge Lanier's desk.' 88
 As she passed the desk,
Judge Lanier put his hand on Bandy's crotch. 187
 Before she left, Judge
Lanier told her that if she came back, she would have all the clients
she wanted. 188
 Bandy never returned and Judge Lanier referred only
two individuals whose cases had been pending at the time of his
meeting with Bandy. 189
Finally, the jury convicted Judge Lanier of sexually assaulting
Sandy Sanders and Sandy Attaway.m Judge Lanier hired Sanders to be
the Youth Services Officer of Dyer County Juvenile Court. 191 During a
weekly meeting between Judge Lanier and Sanders, during which
Judge Lanier reviewed the work of her office, Judge Lanier grabbed
her breasts.' 92
 After she confronted him about the incident, Judge
Lanier began complaining about the quality of her work and eventually
removed her supervisory authority.' 93
In March of 1991, Lanier hired Sandy Attaway as his secretary.' 94
He made it his practice to make sexually suggestive comments and to
slap her on her buttocks during the course of the day.' 95 At one point,
Judge Lanier came up behind Attaway and pushed his pelvis into her
buttocks and made gyrating motions.' 98
 Thereafter, Judge Lanier fired
Attaway and Attaway testified that Judge Lanier told her after he fired
her that ". . . they would have gotten along fine if she had liked to have
oral sex."' 97
Judge Lanier was sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment—
ten years for each count of forcible oral sex and one year for each of
L " See id. at 650.
See id.
' 85 See id.




199 See id. at 646-47,649-50.
tut See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 646.
192 See id.
195 See id. at 646-47.
194 See id, at 649.
195 See id.
196 See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 649.
197 Id. at 649-50.
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the five remaining sexual assault charges.'" Judge Lanier was also
ordered to pay a $25,000 fine.'°' judge Lanier was further ordered to
pay $1,492 per month to cover the costs of his incarceration, provided
that he was entitled to receive and did receive a pension from the State
of Tennessee.2"
In appealing his convictions to the Sixth Circuit, Judge Lanier
argued that his actions did not deprive his victims of any constitution-
ally protected right. 201 The Sixth Circuit disagreed. 2°2 The court rea-
soned that, according to Screws v. United States, if a due process right
has been defined and made specific by court decisions, then a violation
of that right can be vindicated under section 242. 2" The court con-
cluded that the right to bodily integrity had been made specific by
prior court decisions.'"
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that individuals have a his-
toric liberty interest in being free from bodily restraint and punish-
ment. 2" The court reasoned that one aspect of this liberty interest is
the right of personal security protected by the Fourth Amendment. 2°t'
The court recognized that the overriding function of the Fourth
Amendment is to "protect personal privacy and dignity against unwar-
ranted intrusion by the State."'07 The court then reasoned that this
historical liberty interest is violated when a state actor sexually assaults
or sexually molests anyone. 2"
Finally, the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to
establish that Judge Lanier had sexually assaulted the victims and,
therefore, that he deprived them of their constitutionally protected
right not to be sexually assaulted by a state actor. 2" The court added,
however, that not every unjustified or unwanted touching or grabbing
198 See id. at 646, 650.
19° See id. at 650.
200 See id.
201 See Lanier, 33 F.3d at 651. The court noted, however, that at trial Judge Lanier had taken
the position that freedom from sexual assault. was a recognized constitutional right. Id. ]t. was only
after his conviction that he changed his position on appeal. See id. The Sixth Circuit again noted,
however, that Judge Lanier did not cite any authority fur the proposition that freedom from sexual
assault is not a recognized right. Id.
2°2 Id. at 651-52.
205 1d. at 651. (applying Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 (1945)).
204 Id.
205 Id. The court rioted, however, that courts had not yet defined the precise contours of this
historic liberty interest. Id. at 652.
2°6 Lanier, 33 F.3(1 at 652.
2°7 Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977)).
208 Id.
209 Id.
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by a state official constitutes a violation of that person's constitutional
rights. 210
 The court defined the requisite abuse as abuse that must be
of a serious and substantial nature that involves physical force, mental
coercion, bodily injury or emotional damage which is shocking to one's
conscience. 2 " The court concluded that the record clearly indicated
that the jury did not convict judge Lanier merely because of "unwanted
sexual touching." 212
 Thus, the Sixth Circuit held that sexual assault
under color of law constituted a violation of a constitutionally pro-
tected right to bodily integrity. 2u
B. 'fake Tioo: The Sixth Circuit Reverses The Panel Decision
In 1996, on rehearing en bane, a sharply divided Sixth Circuit
reversed the judgment below and instructed the trial court to dismiss
the indictment. 2 " At the outset, the court determined that the specific
question to be answered was whether sexual harassment and assault of
state judicial employees and litigants by a judge violates section 242. 21 '
The court, however, framed its analysis around the "fundamental"
question of whether constitutional rights, for the purposes of criminal
liability, should receive a fixed definition or whether they should be
treated as evolving over time to include the transgression of new
constitutional rights as manifested in civil cases. 216 Consequently, the
court began by emphasizing that, as a general rule, penal laws are to
be construed strictly because it is for the legislature, not the court, to
define a crime and delineate its punishment. 217 Furthermore, the court
recognized that it is inappropriate for courts to create or extend
criminal law by using a common law process of interpretation; if Con-
gress was unclear about what it intended to criminalize, courts should
not hold a defendant criminally liable by defining a new federal
crime.2 's
As a result, the court embarked on an exhaustive investigation of
section 242's legislative history to determine congressional intent. 219
212 Id.
211 Lanier, 33 F.3(1 at 652.
212 id.
211 Id. at 651.
214 United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1394 (Sib Cir. 1996) (en bane) [Lanier 11], rev 'd
and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
212 1d. at 1382.
2 L 6 /d. at 1383.
217 Id.
21l Id.
2111 Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1384-87.
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The court concluded that the broad language of section 242 could be
attributed to changes made in a congressionally commissioned one-vol-
ume compilation of federal statutes as opposed to any specific congres-
sional in ten t. 22" None of the original statutes criminalized deprivations
of all constitutional rights."' The Civil Rights Act of 1866 criminalized
interference with certain statutorily enumerated rights—such as con-
tract, property and equal protection—under color of law. 222 The Ku
Klux Klan Act of 1871 created penalties for violations of any constitu-
tional right under color of law, but only with respect to civil liability. 223
Yet, after the compilation was completed, it contained in section 242
what had not been in the original statutes—criminal liability for viola-
tions of any constitutional right under color of law (as opposed to only
contract, property and equal protection rights). 221
 Thus, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the legislative record of section 242 did not
support an interpretation of the statute that included newly-created
constitutional rights. 225
The Sixth Circuit also examined the case law regarding sexual
assault as a constitutional crime. 220
 The court interpreted the "make
specific" language in Screws to mean that only those constitutional
rights enumerated in the Constitution or specifically delineated in
Supreme Court precedent are within the meaning and scope of section
242. 227
 The court reasoned that, outside of clearly enumerated consti-
tutional rights in the Constitution, only a Supreme Court decision
could provide adequate notice to the whole nation that violating a
particular constitutional right carries criminal as well as civil penal-
22° hi. ;a 1384.
221 See 17 Stat. 13 (1871); 16 Stat. 144 (1870); 14 Stat. 27 (1866); Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1385
& n.2-4.
222 See 14 Sum 27. The statute enumerated those rights as 1 n Alows;
[A111 persons ... shall have the same right, in every Stale or Territory in the United
Slates, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full anti equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of the person and
property ....
Id.
223 See 17 Stat. 13; Lanier II, 77 F.3d at 1385-86 & n.4.
2" Compare 17 Stat. 13 (imposing civil penalties for violating any constitutional right), and
14 Stat. 27 (criminalizing interference with contract, property and eq ual protection rights) with
18 U.S.C. § 242 (criminalizing interference with any constitutional right). See Lanier II, 73 F.3d
at 1386.
225 Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1387.
221 ' Id. at 1387-89. The court specifically limited the scope of its decision to a legal theory
based on substantive due process and nut a crime based on equal protection, state-sanctioned
abuse or any other theory. Id, at 1384.
227 td. at 1391-92.
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ties. 223
 Moreover, the court reasoned that the Supreme Court must not
only have enunciated the existence of a specific right but must also
have applied its ruling in a case with facts "fundamentally similar" to
the one being prosecuted. 229
 In fact, the court concluded that if there
was any ambiguity over the applicability of an enunciated right to a
particular factual situation, then the right had not been adequately
defined. 230
 In so doing, the court held that the "make specific" standard
for determining if a criminal defendant was put on adequate notice
that his or her conduct carried with it criminal liability is substantially
higher than the "clearly established" standard used to determine if a
defendant in a civil case knew or should have known that specific
conduct violated a constitutionally protected right. 231
Consequently, the court noted that, although the language of
cases such as Ingraham v. Wright or Rochin v. California could be used
to construct a right to bodily integrity, neither case enforced such a
right. 232
 In addition, the court distinguished Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey by noting that neither deals with assault, and concluded
that neither stands for the proposition that state law crime of sexual
assault has been recognized by the Supreme Court as a constitutional
tort under section 1983 or a constitutional crime under section 242. 2"
The court further distinguished circuit court of appeals cases that have
recognized a constitutional right to be free from sexual assault as civil
in nature, not criminal. 234
 The court also dismissed United States v.
Davila because the defendants in that case did not challenge the
application of section 242 to sexual assault. 235
228 Id. at. 1392.
229 Id. at 1393.
2A° Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1393.
251 Id. In order For public officials to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the contours of the
right which the victim claims was violated must be clearly established in judicial decisions prior
to or at the time of the official's action, such that a reasonable official would understand that
what he or she was doing violated that right. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
If the right is not "clearly established" at the time of the public official's conduct, then the official
is entitled to qualified immunity—immunity from liability for actions taken in his or her official
capacity. See id. at 638140.
252 Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1388.
M
2A4 Id. (citing Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (Parker, J., concurring)
("The notion that individuals have a fundamental substantive due process right to bodily integrity
is beyond debate.')); Doe v. Taylor lndep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 451 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
("[S]urely the Constitution protects a schoolchild from physical sexual abuse ... by a public
school leacher."). In addition, the court criticized the cases for simply making assertions rather
than basing their decision on precedent. Lanier ll, 73 F.3d at 1388.
255 Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1388 (citing United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749 (1983) (affirming
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The court further concluded that recognizing sexual assault as a
constitutional crime would be tantamount to creating a new crime and
subjecting defendants to an ex post facto effect. 236
 In so doing, the
court determined that recognizing sexual assault as a constitutional
crime would violate three general canons governing judicial construc-
tion of criminal statutes: that the legislature, not the judiciary, is the
primary source of federal criminal law; that ambiguous statutes should
be construed in favor of the defendant; and that criminal statutes are
normally strictly construed by the courts. 237
 Thus, the Sixth Circuit
concluded that holding judge Lanier criminally liable would be meting
out punishment without fair notice of criminal liability and would
violate these canons of federal criminal jurisprudence• 238
Finally, the court recognized that section 242, unlike most crimi-
nal statutes, does not criminalize conduct; rather, it criminalizes viola-
tions of abstract rights. 2" Therefore, conduct that may be illegal under
state law, such as murder, is not necessarily deprivation of a constitu-
tional right. 24° The court noted that even in Screws, murder had to
constitute a "trial by ordeal" to rise to the level of a procedural due
process violation. 24 ' Consequently, the court emphasized that it was not
holding that sexual assault could never violate section 242.242 Rather,
under the facts of this case, the court held only that sexual assault
could not be prosecuted as a violation of a constitutional substantive
due process right to bodily integrity. 243
The court's opinion engendered five separate dissents. 214
 Two
judges dissented from the dismissal of the felony counts relating to the
oral rapes but concurred in dismissing the misdemeanor counts relat-
ing to lesser assault and harassment charges. 24' Three judges dissented
a section 242 conviction Ito sexual assault which constituted a deprivation of constitutional
rights)). For a discussion of Davila, see supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
236
 Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1390.
237 1d. at 1389-91 (citing United States v. Wiltherger, 18 U.S. 76,93 (1820)).
23f Id. at 1389-91.
29 Id. at 1393.
24" See id. at 1393.
241 Larder II, 73 F.3cl at 1393 (citing Screws, 325 U.S. at 92-93,106 (holding that beating and
resultant death of suspect was "trial by ordeal," depriving suspect of constitutional rights in
violation or section 242)).
292
243 Id. Specifically, the court explained that it was not considering whether sexual assault
could constitute a constitutional crime based on equal protection, state-sanctioned abuse or some
other legal theory. Id. at 1384.
299
	 id. at 1394 (Welliiird, J., dissenting), 1397 (Nelson, J., dissenting), 1399 (Keith, J.,
dissenting), 1400 (Jones, J., dissenting), 1403 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
245 See id. at 1394 (Wellford, J., dissenting), 1398-99 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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as to the dismissal of all charges. 246 The primary dissent was written by
Judge Daughtrey, who argued that the court incorrectly applied a
heightened standard for determining if a constitutional right has been
"made specific" and concluded that the constitutional guarantee of
bodily integrity extends to sexual assault. 247 judge Daughtrey found the
majority's foray into the legislative history of section 242 unwarranted
because the language of the statute lacks any ambiguity. 248 Judge
Daughtrey also outright rejected the majority's interpretation that only
a Supreme Court decision involving a fundamentally similar factual
situation can "make specific" a right for purposes of section 242. 249
Moreover, Judge Daughtrey noted that over the years, Congress had
amended section 242 but had chosen not to restrict its scope.25° There-
fore, Judge Daughtrey reasoned that the proper inquiry was whether
court decisions had made specific a constitutional right to be free from
bodily integrity. 251
Examining both Supreme Court and appellate court decisions,
Judge Daughtrey concluded that not only does a constitutional right
to bodily integrity exist, but a specific right to be free from sexual
assault also exists. 252 Judge Daughtrey reasoned that the widely held
assumption that a right to be free from invasions of bodily integrity
under color of law exists, provided a basis upon which to recognize
that such a right has been made specific. 2" Judge Daughtrey further
246 See Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1399 (Keith, J., dissenting), 1400 (Jones, J., dissenting), 1403
(Daughtrey, J„ dissenting),
247 Id. at 1409-13 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
'248 ,/d. at 1408 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 14(}9 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson also did not agree that lower courts
are estopped from applying section 242 in the absence of a Supreme Court case directly on point.
Id. at 1399 (Nelson, J„ dissenting). Indeed, it was unclear to him how such a case would ever
reach the Supreme Court if such a standard were required. See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
25° Id. at 1408 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
251 Lanier II, 73 F.3(1 at 1408 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 1408-1'1 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson reasoned that there is nothing
"new" about this liberty interest. Id. at 1398 (Nelson, J., dissenting). In his view, Judge Lanier
literally and humiliatingly deprived Archie of her liberty when he pinned her down in a chair
and forced her to pertbrin oral sex on him. Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson noted that
in addition to physically restraining Archie, Judge Lanier also mentally and emotionally coerced
Archie by suggesting that he would take Archie's daughter away in a custody suit if she resisted.
Id. (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Nelson concluded that Judge Lanier deprived Archie of the
possession and control of her own person and subjugated her to the "vilest sort of restraint and
interference." Id. at 1399 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judge Wellford also reasoned that the Supreme
Court has recognized that people have a constitutional right to bodily integrity. Id. at 1396
(Wellford, J., dissenting). Judge Jones, for the purposes of section 242, concluded that the right
to be free from invasions of bodily integrity has indeed been "made specific" by court decisions.
Id. at 1401 (Jones, J., dissenting). .
252 Id. at 1412 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). Judge Jones, in particular, dissented from the
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reasoned that sexual assault is one of the most blatant and serious
invasions of a person's bodily integrity. 254 Thus, Judge Daughtrey con-
cluded that the majority was unjustified in determining that the right
to be free from a willful sexual assault under color of law has not been
"made specific" by prior court decisions simply because no Supreme
Court case has explicitly involved a judge so misusing his position and
influence.255
C. Take Three: The Supreme Court Reverses the Reversal and Clarifies
the Proper Standard for Determining if Conduct Violates 18 U.S. C. § 242
In 1997, in a unanimous decision, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit, holding that the circuit court applied
the incorrect standard for determining whether or not conduct falls
within the scope of criminal liability under section 242. 2'1 ' Because the
Sixth Circuit used the wrong standard, the Court remanded the case
for consideration under the appropriate standard as articulated in the
Court's opinion.257 Thus, the Court's decision left undecided whether
Judge Lanier deprived his victims of a constitutionally protected right
to be free from sexual assault. 258
In delineating the correct standard for determining if conduct
falls within the scope of criminal liability under section 242, the Su-
majority's rejection of the right to bodily integrity as grounds for a section 242 conviction because
the right has been largely defined in civil rather than criminal cases. Id. at 1401 (Jones, J.,
dissenting). Judge Jones reasoned that the protections of the Constitution do not change accord.
ing to the procedural context in which they are enforced. Id. at 1401-02 (Jones, J., dissenting).
254 Id. ( Daugh ivy, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 1414 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). Judge Keith joined Judge Daughtrey's dissenting
opinion, Id. at 1399-1400 (Keith, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Judge Keith chastised the majority
for ignoring the "clearly established" law protecting each person's right to be free from interfer-
ence with bodily integrity as well as for ignoring the outrageous nature of Judge Lanier's conduct.
Id. at. 1400 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith further deplored the result of the majority opinion
as sanctioning Judge Lanier's conduct. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Keith rea-
soned that releasing a judge who has repeatedly victimized women back into the community will
flintier undermine the public's confidence in the justice system. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting),
251; Lanier III, 117 S. Ca. 1219,1224 (1997).
257
 Id. at 1228.
ass See id. The Court also left open other issues for the court of appeals to consider on
remand. See Id. at n.7. For example, the Court expressed no opinion on whether Judge Lanier
acted "under color of law." See id. at n.2. The Court, however, explicitly dismissed several of the
arguments raised by Lanier for lack of merit. Id. at n.7. First, the Court dismissed Lanier's
contention that Spews excluded rights protected wider the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from the ambit of section 242. Id. Second, the Court dismissed Lanier's contention
that there is no constitutional right to be free from state-occasioned assauh outside of a custodial
setting. Id. Third, the Court dismissed Lanier's contention that constitutional claims relating to
state-occasioned physical abuse must arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. Id.
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preme Court noted that section 242 criminalizes conduct that is not
defined with particularity and that the general terms of section 242
incorporate constitutional law by reference. 259 The Court reasoned,
however, that any concern over the due process requirement of notice
is satisfied if potential defendants have "fair warning" of what consti-
tutes constitutionally impermissible conduct such that they are not
"held criminally responsible for conduct which [they] could not rea-
sonably understand to be proscribed: 260 The touchstone, as deter-
mined by the Court, is whether "the statute, [either] standing alone or
as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the
defendant's conduct was criminal: 261 The Court further reasoned that
Screws articulated the "fair warning" standard by limiting the scope of
section 242 to "rights fairly warned of, having been 'made specific' by
the time of the charged conduct. "262
To further elucidate the "fair warning" standard, the Supreme
Court equated the "fair warning" requirement to the "clearly estab-
lished" immunity standard in the civil context. 263 Each, the Court ex-
plained, "seeks to ensure that defendants 'reasonably can anticipate
when their conduct may give rise to liability'. . . by attaching liability
only if [t]he contours of the right [violated are] sufficiently clear that
a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates
that right. . . .'"264 The Court reasoned that the difference in applica-
tion—the fact that the "fair warning" standard is applied in a criminal
context and the "clearly established" immunity standard is applied in
a civil context—is of no consequence because both serve the same
purpose. 265 In fact, according to the Court, the qualified immunity test
259 Id. at 1224 n.1	 n.2. The Court acknowledged that the consolidated statute of 1874
expanded the scope of its statutory predecessors to apply to deprivations of all constitutional
rights despite assertions at the time by the proponents of section 242 that they had merely clarified
and reorganized the law without changing its substance. Id. at 1224 n. 1. The Court emphasized,
however, that since the 1874 recodification and the Screws Court's interpretation of section 242.
Congress has amended section 242 on numerous occasions, increasing the penalties kir violating
the statute without limiting the substantive scope of section 242. Id. (citing 35 Stat. 1092 (1909)
(adding willfulness requirement); 82 Stat. 75 (1968) (enhancing penalties for some violations);
102 Stat. 4396 (1988) (same); 108 Stat. 1970, 2109, 2113, 2147 (1994) (same)); see Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). Thus, the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit had placed too much
emphasis on the tarnished origin of the recodification and, therefore, misapprehended the
proper scope and intent of section 242. Lanier III, 117 S. Ct. at 1224 11.1 & 1226 n.6.
26D hi.  at 1224-25. (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (19(14) (quoting United
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954))).
210 Lanier III, 117 S. Ct. at 1225.
262 Id. at 1226.
263 Id. at 1227-28. Sec supra note 231 for a discussion of qualified immunity.
264 Id. at 1227.
2ro
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is simply an adaptation of the "fair warning" standard, designed to
afford officials and governments the same protection from civil liability
that individuals have traditionally been granted from vague criminal
statutes. 2"6 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Circuit erred
in determining that the "make specific" standard under section 242
demands more specificity than the "clearly established" law used to
judge qualified immunity in section 1983 civil cases. 267
In so doing, the Supreme Court assigned error to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's conclusions that only a Supreme Court decision that enunciates
the existence of a constitutional right and applies it to fundamentally
similar factual situation can provide sufficient notice that a constitu-
tional right has been made specific within the meaning of Screws."
Specifically, the Court reasoned that "the universe of relevant interpre-
tive decisions" for purposes of providing "fair warning" is not limited
to Supreme Court decisions. 2 G 9 Contrary to the Sixth Circuit's conclu-
sion, the Court noted that in the past it has relied on appeals court
decisions in determining if a right has been "clearly established."27"The
Court also reasoned that, although the Sixth Circuit articulated a valid
concern that disparate court opinions may create uncertainty in the
law (even on a point widely considered), any such uncertainty may be
taken into account in deciding if the defendant, in fact, had "fair
warning."271
In addition, the Court concluded that the strict factual identity
to precedent required by the Sixth Circuit is both unwarranted and
problematic. 272 The Court reasoned that as long as prior decisions give
reasonable notice that the conduct at issue violates a constitutional
right, then such precedent may be relied upon to provide "fair warn-
ing," despite notable factual differences. 273 Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the Sixth Circuit's "fundamentally similar" standard is prob-
lematic because it would lead trial judges to demand an unnecessarily
high degree of certainty and require something beyond "fair warn-
ing."Th' Thus, the Supreme Court held that neither a Supreme Court
decision nor the strict factual identity required by the Sixth Circuit is
266 Lanier 111,117 S. Ct.. at 1227.
267 Id, at 1226-27.
2611 /41, at 1226.
269 m.
270 a
271 Lanier 111,117 S. Gt. at 1226-27.
272 1d. at 1227.
2731d.
274 Id.
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necessary to provide a defendant with "fair warning" that the defen-
dant's conduct violated a constitutional right. 275
In sum, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant
will be found criminally liable under section 242, as with civil liability
under section 1983, if the unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct is
apparent under the Constitution and pre-existing law. 276 Accordingly,
the Court held that the Sixth Circuit applied the wrong standard in
deciding whether prior decisions gave Judge Lanier "fair warning" that
sexual assault violated his victims' constitutional right to be free from
state-occasioned intrusions upon their bodily integrity. 277
 Thus, the
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and
remanded the case for application of the proper standard. 278
III. Is THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY SUFFICIENTLY EsTABLisitED
To TRIGGER 18 U.S.0 § 242?
Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court as well as courts of
appeal decisions across the nation have recognized that the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to bodily
integrity insofar as it is conceptually integrated with both the idea of
being secure in one's person and the right to be free from bodily
restraint.279 The conceptual integration of bodily integrity on the one
hand and personal security on the other is evidenced by the Supreme
Court's decision in Rochin v. California. 280 In Rochin, the defendant's
275 Id. at 1226-27.




 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) ("[T] he right to persona] security
constitutes a 'historic liberty interest' protected substantively by the Due Process Clause.");
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) ("Among the historic liberties . . . [protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment is the] right to he free from and obtain judicial relief, for unjustified
intrusions on personal security."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (Pumping the
stomach of a suspect violates "personal immunities which . are 'so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" (quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth
of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934))); Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450-51
(5th Cir. 1994) (en bane) ("[T]he right to he free from state-occasioned damage to a person's
bodily integrity is protected by the [F]ourteenth [A]mendinent guarantee of due process."
(quoting ShillingfOrd v. Holmes, 643 F.2d 234, 265 (5th Cir. 1981))); Stoneking v. Bradford
Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 727 (3rd Cir. 1989) (en bane) ("Reasonable officials would have
understood the 'contours' of a student's right to bodily integrity, under the Due Process Clause,
to encompass a student's right to be free from sexual assaults by his or her teachers."); Hall v.
Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) ("[G]rounded in those constitutional rights given
protection under the rubric of substantive due process . . . [is] the right to be free of state
intrusions into realms of personal privacy and bodily security ....").
2W 342 U.S. at 168-74 (holding that police violated constitutional right by pumping suspect's
stomach for evidence).
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stomach was pumped against his wi1L 281 This act was, at its most ba-
sic, a violation of the defendant's bodily integrity—the ability to main-
tain physical autonomy.282 The Court articulated the violation as one
that shocks the conscience:288 Moreover, the Court reasoned that the
right to maintain one's physical autonomy outweighed a legitimate
state objective of obtaining eviclence. 284 In the Lanier case, the con-
duct ofJudge Lanier is aptly described as shocking to the conscience. 285
Indeed, forcing a woman to perform oral sex and ejaculating in her
mouth is certainly no less a violation of her bodily integrity than forc-
ing a tube down an unwilling suspect's trachea to pump his stomach. 28"
The Court further defined the scope of bodily integrity in Cruzan
v. Director; Missouri Department of Health. 287 In Cruzan, the Court ob-
served that: "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of
law."288 The Court not only recognized the right to bodily integrity but
also that the right to bodily integrity provides the conceptual under-
pinning for the informed consent doctrine:289 In so doing, the Court
explicitly acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment constitution-
ally protects a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment:299
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the
Supreme Court again affirmed the constitutional right that individuals
have in personal autonomy and bodily integrity. 29 ' The Court reaffir-
med earlier precedent as not only exemplary of liberty "hut as a rule
281 .See id. at 156.
282 	at 169, 172.
283 Id. at 172,
284 See id. at 172-73.
285 See United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1395 (6th Cir, 1996) (Wellford, J., dissenting)
[Lanier Iq, mad and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997),
288 Compare Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1405 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting) (holding that oral rape
violates bodily integrity), with Roehin, 342 U.S. at 172-73 (holding that pumping stomach against
will of suspect violates bodily integrity).
287 497 U.S. 261, 269, 278-79, 281 (1990) (weighing the right to bodily integrity against
relevant state interest in preserving liie).
288 1(1. at 259 (quoting Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
289 See id. at 269, 278.
290 Id. at 278.
291 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) ("Constitutional protection of the woman's decision to
terminate her pregnancy derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government
may nut enter.").
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. . . of personal autonomy and bodily integrity." 292 Moreover, in analyz-
ing the spousal notification requirement—which the Court decided
was unconstitutional—the Court stressed that the protected liberty
interest was doubly implicated because "the State has touched upon
not only the private sphere of family but upon the very bodily integrity
of the pregnant woman."'" Thus, Supreme Court precedent has rec-
ognized the existence of a liberty interest that protects individuals from
state-occasioned violations of their bodily integrity. 294
This is all the more clear if one considers the contrary: that
citizens do not have the right to be free from state-occasioned viola-
tions of their bodily integrity. The idea that individuals should be
secure in their persons and protected from intrusions on their bodily
integrity by the state is deeply rooted in the American notion of auton-
orny. 295 The Constitution does not expressly or implicitly delegate the
power to abrogate a person's bodily integrity. On the contrary, the
protections of the Fourth, Fifth and Eighth Amendments make certain
that limits are expressly placed upon violations of bodily integrity that
the state might otherwise consider legitimate. Indeed, the right to
bodily integrity sits at the core of these amendments and the American
notion of limited government.
Additionally, the fact that courts balance the liberty interest indi-
viduals have in being free from invasions of bodily integrity against
state interests in violating that liberty underscores the legitimacy and
value of the right itself.'" Certainly there are legitimate reasons for an
individual's protected liberty interest to be compromised, but such
compromises exist only within certain constitutional boundaries. 297 In
Cruzan, the Court weighed the constitutionally protected liberty inter-
est of bodily self-determination against the state interest in requiring
292 Id. at 857.
293
 Id. at 896.
2" See supra notes 36-151 and accompanying text.
295 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287
-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because our notions of
liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, the
Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the interest protected by
the Due Process Clause."); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,169 (1952) (holding that pumping
stomach of suspect violates "fundamental" right).
296 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-81 (balancing right to refuse treatment against state
interest in protecting life); Youngberg v. Romeo, 475 U.S. 307,320 (1982) (balancing "liberty of
individual" against "demands of an organized society"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S, 651,675-76
(1977) (balancing child's liberty interest in avoiding corporal punishment against traditionally
accepted practice and need to "correct" schoolchildren.).
297 See, e.g., Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-81; Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 321; Ingraham, 430 U.S.
675-76.
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clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent patient's desire to
have life sustaining treatment terminated. 298 Similarly, in Ingraham v.
Wright, the Court recognized that corporal punishment in school im-
plicated a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 299
The Court concluded, however, that there were procedural protections
as well as the need for teachers to maintain order and the general
acceptance of the practice that allowed the State to abrogate the
students' recognized liberty interest. 390 In Doe v. Taylor Independent
School District, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized
that although the use of corporal punishment may be justified, there
can never be a justification for sexually molesting a schoolchild. 301
Similarly, in the Lanier case, there are no legitimate state interests that
could justify a sitting judge sexually assaulting litigants, employees of
the court or others with whom he conducts the business of the court. 302
Finally, the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the citizens of this country from state-occasioned violations of a per-
son's bodily integrity is inescapable when one also considers the una-
nimity with which federal courts generally have reached the same
conclusion in analogous circumstances." If, in fact, there was some
significant dissension among the circuit courts it might be possible to
argue that the state of the law is unclear; but that is not the case. 304 It
is also important to note that by 1989, the law clearly established that
violations of a person's bodily integrity by a public official implicated
298 497 U.S. at 278-81.
299 430 U.S. at 674.
306 Id. at 676, 683.
301 15 F.3d 443, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994).
3()2 Compare Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1388-89, with Taylor, 15 [3d at 451-52 ("It is incontrovertible
that bodily integrity is necessarily violated when a state actor sexually abuses a schoolchild and
that such misconduct deprives the child of rights vouchsafed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
"See, e.g., Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3c1 1297, 1302 (5th Cir. 1995) (en bane) (reiterating
the Fifth Circuit's recognition that "[t] he right to he free of state-occasioned damage to a person's
bodily integrity is protected by the Fourteenth [A]mendment guarantee of due process");
Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Casey for the proposition that
lilt is settled now . . . that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's ... bodily integrity"); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1 981 ) (recog-
nizing that "[t] he right to he free of state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity is
protected by the inourteenth 1Almendinent guarantee of due process"); Hall v. Tawney, 621
F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that the right to be free from intrusions of bodily
security that shock the conscience "is unmistakably established in our constitutional decisions as
an attribute of the ordered liberty that is the concern of substantive due process"); Gregory v.
Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 62 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that "[t]he right violated by an assault has
been described as the right to be secure in one's person, and is grounded in the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
864
	 e.g., Walton, 44 F.3d at 1302; Canedy, 16 F.3d at 185; Shillingford, 634 F.2d at 265;
Gregory, 500 E2d at 62.
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a constitutionally protected right. 30" Thus, any reasonable public of-
ficial, and certainly a sitting judge, had fair warning that violating the
bodily integrity of another person violated that person's constitution-
ally protected right to be secure in one's person and to be free of
state-occasioned violations of one's bodily integrity. 3°6
IV., SEXUAL ASSAULT VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO BODILY INTEGRITY
Recognizing that citizens have a constitutionally protected right
from being sexually assaulted by public officials acting under color of
law can be understood by virtue of the fact that bodily integrity is con-
ceptually integrated with the right to be free from bodily restraint. 307
A person cannot be sexually assaulted without being physically re-
strained." This is most vividly evidenced in the Lanier case by the oral
rape of Vivian Archie: Judge Lanier had his hands on her throat, forced
open her jaws and grabbed the back of her head to hold her down
while he forced himself on her. 3"9
Moreover, concluding that the right to bodily integrity is protected
by the liberty interest of the Fourteenth Amendment leads to the
seemingly axiomatic principle that a citizen's right not to be deprived
of liberty without due process of law encompasses the right not to be
intentionally and sexually assaulted under color of law.m A fundamen-
tal right that protects a criminal defendant from having his stomach
pumped against his will must also protect a law abiding citizen from
having her jaws forced open and being coerced into engaging in oral
305 See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (stating in 1982 that "the right
to personal security constitutes a 'historic liberty interest' protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause"); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (stating in 1977 that "(a]mong
the historic liberties ... [protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is the] right to be free from
and obtain judicial relief, for unjustified intrusions on personal security"); Rochin, 342 U.S. at
169 (holding in 1952 that pumping stomach of suspect violates "personal immunities which, ...
are `so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'"
(quoting Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U,S. 97, 105 (1934)); Taylor, 15 F.3d at
450-51 (reiterating Fifth Circuit's 1981 conclusion in Shillingford that "[t]he right to be free from
state-occasioned damage to a person's bodily integrity is protected by the [F]ourteenth [A]mend-
ment guarantee of due process"); Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 722, 726
(3d Cir. 1989) (holding that the constitutional right to be free from invasion of personal security
through sexual abuse was well-established even before 1980).
306 See, e.g., Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315; Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 673; Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169;
Thylor, 15 F.3d at 450-51; Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 722, 726.
307 See Lanier II, 73 F.3d at 1398 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
308 See id. (Nelson, J., dissenting).
309 See id. at 1405 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Lanier coerced her with the
thinly veiled threat that Archie would lose custody of her child if she resisted. See id. at 1398
(Nelson, J., dissenting).
310 See id. at 1411 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting).
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sex. 3 " If bodily integrity is to have any substantive meaning in our
society, it must encompass the notion that the most intimate and
private aspects of our bodies are protected from intrusion by the state
and its agents.' 12
In addition, sexual assault is qualitatively different from other
types of physical abuse. Describing rape, the Supreme Court has stated:
It is highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its
almost total contempt for the personal integrity and auton-
omy of the female victim and the latter's privilege of choosing
those with whom intimate relationships are to be established.
Short of homicide, it is the "ultimate violation of self." 313
As the "ultimate violation of self," sexual assault, by definition,
violates bodily integrity. Bodily integrity cannot be defined outside
of sexual self-determination. Exposing one's body in a sexual con-
text is one of the most intimate and private acts people share. It lies
at the root of why "the Constitution places limits on a State's right
to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood . . . as well as bodily integrity." 3 '`' Moreover, there can
never be a justification For sexual assault, as there could be for the
use of force in an arrest situation.''' Therefore, even though courts
have traditionally weighed an individual's protected liberty interest
against legitimate state interest, in the case of sexual assault, a per-
311 See Roehin, 342 U.S. at 169-72.
312 See Gruzan v. Director; Missouri Dept of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body
repugnant to the interest protected by the Due Process Clause,"); see also United States v,
Contreras, 950 F.2d '232, 236, 244 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction of officer under section
242 for depriving woman of her constitutionally protected right to be free of state-occasioned
sexual assault); United States v. Davila, 704 F.2d 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1983) (same). The notion that
invasions or our bodily integrity are repugnant to the Constitution explains, in part why, in both
Contreras and Davila, where the defendants were convicted under section 242 for depriving
women of their constitutional rights by sexually assaulting them, the convictions were upheld
without raising the issue of whether or not the victims suffered a deprivation of a recognized
constitutional right. Contreras, 95{} F.2d at 236, 244; Davila, 704 F.2d at 750.
313 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977). In 1977, in Coker, a plurality of the United
State Supreme Court held that the crime of rape did not warrant punishment by death. Id. at
592. Although the Court reasoned that. rape is reprehensible, it concluded that punishment of
death was not commensurate with the crime. Id. at 592, 597-98. Thus, the Supreme Court held
that the sentence of death for the crime of rape is grossly disproportionate and excessive and,
therefore, constitutionally forbidden. Id. at 592.
314 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (3rd Cir.
1992).
313 See, e.g., Doe v. Taylor Independent School District, 15 F.3d 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that sexual abuse can never serve legitimate state interest).
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petrator should be on notice that such conduct is never justified."'
Thus, recognizing that sexual assault violates a right to bodily integ-
rity is not the same as declaring all physical contact as violative of
bodily in tegri ty. 317
Although no Supreme Court decision has explicitly held that
sexual assault violates the protected liberty interest in being free from
intrusions on a person's bodily integrity, a number of appeals courts
have addressed the issue.'" Sexual assault, as a violation of a protected
constitutional right, has been most directly addressed in a school
setting where a public school official or teacher has sexually assaulted
a student.' 19 In both Doe v. "Taylor Independent School District and Stonek-
ing v. Bradford Area School District, however, each court reasoned that
sexual assault violated a widely recognized constitutional right as op-
posed to reasoning that students are protected from their teachers in
some manner unique to the student/teacher relationship.s 2° The fact
that the assault was perpetrated by a teacher upon a student is relevant
only in that the perpetrator was a public official acting under color of
316 See, e.g., Taylor, 15 F3d at 452 ("[T]here is never any justification for sexually molesting
a schoolchild, and thus, no state interest, analogous to the punitive and disciplinary objectives
attendant to corporal punishment., which might support it."); Contreras, 950 F.2d at 236, 244
(upholding conviction of officer for "willfully depriving [woman] of her constitutional rights,
while acting under color of law, by sexually assaulting her, in violation of section 242"); Davila,
704 F.2d at 750 (same).
317 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 930 U.S. 651, 674-76 (1977) (holding that corporal punish-
ment implicates constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 172 (1952) (holding that conduct that violates constitutional rights is "conduct that shocks
the conscience"); Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that not all
criminal assaults constitute violations of a constitutional right).
318 See, e.g., Thylar, 15 F.3d at 451 (concluding that "the Constitution protects a schoolchild
from physical sexual abuse"); Contreras, 950 F.2d at 236, 244 (upholding conviction of officer for
"willfully depriving [woman] of her constitutional rights, while acting under color of law, by
sexually assaulting her, in violation of section 242"); Dang ‘rang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d
476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant clearly "used his position in the state
government to deprive these women of their constitutional right to be free from sexual assault");
Stuneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 726-27 (3d. Cir. 1989) (holding that sexual
abuse, as violation of constitutional right to be free from invasions of personal security, was
well-established because "a teacher's sexual molestation of a student could not possibly be deemed
an acceptable practice"); Davila, 704 F.2d at 750 (upholding criminal conviction of officers under
section 242 for depriving women of their constitutionally protected liberty by coercing sexual
favors from them).
519 Taylor, 15 F.3d at 446-49 (leacher sexually assaulting student); Sioneking 882 F.2d
726-27 (same); rf. Contreras-, 950 F.2d at 236, 244 (officers sexually assaulting women); Davila,
704 F.2d at 750 (same).
"3 Taylor, 15 F.3d at 452 n.3 (holding that fact that there was no "special relationship" does
not suggest that Individuals, whether 'under state's care' or not, have no due process rights
against an offending state actor"); Sioneking 882 F.2d at 724 (declining to rest decision on
affirmative duty to protect students).
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law."' just as it is inconceivable that a reasonable public school official
could have assumed that sexually assaulting a student does not violate
a constitutionally protected right, a sitting judge could not have been
unaware that sexually assaulting women in his chambers while conduct-
ing the business of the court violated their constitutionally protected
right to be free from invasions of bodily integrity by a public official
acting under color of law. 322
Even niore specifically, in United States v. Contreras and United
States v. Davila, law enforcement officers were convicted (and their
convictions upheld) under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for violating their victims'
constitutionally protected right to be free from sexual assault by public
officials acting under color of law.'" It is irrelevant for the purpose of
providing notice that the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not
specifically consider whether the scope of section 242 properly in-
cluded sex crimes. 524 The fact that the defendants were convicted
provides fair warning that sexual assault under color of law violates
section 242."5
Moreover, as with the right to bodily integrity, there is no dissen-
sion among the courts as to whether sexual assault violates a constitu-
tionally protected right. 326 Finally, by the time Judge Lanier began
harassing and sexually assaulting women in his chambers, the case law
521 See Stonehing, 882 F.2d at 724 (distinguishing DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department
of Social Services, 489 U,S. 189 (1989) and emphasizing status of perpetrator as state actor).
Whether Judge Lanier acted under color of state law is not addressed by this Note but will,
undoubtedly, he considered by the Sixth Circuit on remand. See United States v. Lanier, 117 S.
Ct. 1219, 1224 n.2 (1997) (leaving open the question whether Judge Lanier acted under color
of law for review on remand) [Lanier III].
322 See Taylor, 15 F.3(1 at 455 ("No reasonable public school official in 1987 would have
assumed that he could, with constitutional immunity, sexually molest a minor student."); Stonek-
ing, 882 F.2d at 726-27 (holding that the constitutional right to be free from invasion of personal
security—in this case through sexual abuse—was well-established because "a teacher's sexual
molestation of a student could not possibly he deemed an acceptable practice"); see also Davila,
704 F.2d at 750 (upholding 1082 conviction of officers under section 242 for depriving women
of their constitutional rights by coercing sexual favors from them).
3 '2'1 Contreras, 950 F2d at 236, 244; Davila, 704 F.2d at 750.
324 See Lanier III, 117 S. Ct. at 1227 ("[Cdeneral statements of the law are not inherently
incapable of giving lair and clear warning, and in other instances a general constitutional rule
already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct
question, even though 'the very action in question has [not] previously been held unlawful.'")
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
525 See id.
326 See, e.g., Taylot; 15 F.3d at 451 (concluding that "the Constitution protects a schoolchild
from physical sexual abuse"); Contreras, 950 F.2d at 236, 244; Dang Vang v, Vang Xiong X. Toyed,
944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant clearly used his position in the
state government to deprive these women of their constitutional right to be free from sexual
assault"); Stinking! 882 F.2d at 726-27; Davila, 704 F.2d at 750.
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declaring that sexual assault violates a constitutional right was "clearly
established."327 Thus, Judge Lanier had "fair warning" that his conduct
was not only prohibited by state criminal laws but also violated a
constitutionally protected right to be free from sexual assault. 328
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court precedent has indicated and appeals court deci-
sions have reiterated that the Constitution does indeed protect a right
that sits at the core of our individuality: the right to bodily integrity. 329
Furthermore, the right to bodily integrity is embodied in the notion
that the state cannot deprive citizens of their freedom as articulated in
the Bill of Rights and as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment: 33"
In addition, the right to bodily integrity is conceptually integrated with
the right to be free from bodily restraint."' The right to be free from
bodily restraint is implicated when a person is sexually abused or
raped."2 Similarly, the right to be free from sexual abuse perpetrated
under color of state law is a right protected by the concept that the
state cannot violate an individual's bodily integrity without justifica-
tion."33 Furthermore, constitutional protection of the right to bodily
integrity does not require that all crimes involving physical invasions
be "constitutional crimes."334 Only physical invasions that are perpe-
trated by state actors under color of law and that cannot be rationally
justified fall within the scope of the protected right. 335 Because sexual
'-47 See, e.g., Taylor, 15 F.:3cl at 455 ("The 'contours' of a student's substantive due process
right to be free from sexual abuse and violations of her bodily integrity were clearly established
in 1987."); Stoneking 882 F.2d at 726-27 (holding in 1989 that the constitutional right to be free
from invasion of personal security—in this case through sexual abuse—was well-established);
Davila, 704 F.2d at 750 (upholding 1982 criminal conviction of officers under section 242 for
depriving women of their constitutionally protected liberty by coercing sexual Ilivors from them).
5'!8 See, e.g., Taylor; IS F.3d at 455; Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 726-27; Davila, 704 F.2d at 750.
828 See .supra Parts IR, I.C. and III.
"1 See supra Parts 1.11. and Ill.
"I See supra Part IV.
"2 See United States v. Lanier, 73 F.3d 1380, 1398 (6th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Nelson, J.,
dissenting) [Lanier	 tend and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1224 (1997).
"3 See id.; see also United States v. Contreras, 950 F.2d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1991); Davila, 704
F.2d at 750.
83-I See supra Parts III and IV.
"5 See, e.g., DeShutrey v. Winnebago County Dcp't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989)
("[A] State's failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not constitute a
violation of the Due Process Clause."); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977) (holding
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assault can never be justified as a legitimate state interest, it can never
outweigh the constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity
ANDREW J. SIMONS
536 See, e.g., Doc v. 'fight'. Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 13{1 443, 452 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
(concluding that sexual abuse can never serve legitimate state interest); see film Rocklin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding that state interest in obtaining evidence cannot
justify violating bodily integrity of defendant); Contreras, 950 F.2d at 236, 244 (upholding comic-
don of officer for "willfully depriving [woman] of her constitutional rights, while acting under
color of law, by sexually assaulting her, in violation of section 212 "); Davila, 704 F.2d at 750 (same).
